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Abstract
We discuss how the method of maximum entropy, MaxEnt, can be
extended beyond its original scope, as a rule to assign a probability distri-
bution, to a full-fledged method for inductive inference. The main concept
is the (relative) entropy S[p|q] which is designed as a tool to update from
a prior probability distribution q to a posterior probability distribution
p when new information in the form of a constraint becomes available.
The extended method goes beyond the mere selection of a single poste-
rior p, but also addresses the question of how much less probable other
distributions might be. Our approach clarifies how the entropy S[p|q] is
used while avoiding the question of its meaning. Ultimately, entropy is a
tool for induction which needs no interpretation. Finally, being a tool for
generalization from special examples, we ask whether the functional form
of the entropy depends on the choice of the examples and we find that it
does. The conclusion is that there is no single general theory of inductive
inference and that alternative expressions for the entropy are possible.
1 Introduction
The method of maximum entropy, MaxEnt, as conceived by Jaynes [1], is a
method to assign probabilities on the basis of partial information of a certain
kind. The type of information in question is called testable information and
consists in the specification of the family of acceptable distributions. The infor-
mation is “testable” in the sense that one should be able to test whether any
candidate distribution belongs or not to the family.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss how MaxEnt can be extended beyond
its original scope, as a rule to assign a probability distribution, to a full-fledged
method for inductive inference. To distinguish it from MaxEnt the extended
method will henceforth be abbreviated as ME. [2]
The general problem of inductive inference is to update from a prior prob-
ability distribution to a posterior distribution when new information becomes
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available. The challenge is to develop updating methods that are systematic
and objective. Two methods have been found which are of very broad applica-
bility: one is based on Bayes’ theorem and the other is ME. The choice between
these two updating methods is dictated by the nature of the information being
processed.
When we want to update our beliefs about the values of certain quantities θ
on the basis of information about the observed values of other quantities x – the
data – and of the known relation between them – the conditional distribution
p(x|θ) – we must use Bayes’ theorem. If the prior beliefs are given by p(θ), the
updated or posterior distribution is p(θ|x) ∝ p(θ)p(x|θ). Being a consequence
of the product rule for probabilities, the Bayesian method of updating is limited
to situations where it makes sense to define the joint probability of x and θ.
The ME method, on the other hand, is designed for updating from a prior
probability distribution to a posterior distribution when the information to be
processed is testable information, i.e., it takes the form of constraints on the
family of acceptable posterior distributions [3]. In general it makes no sense to
process testable information using Bayes’ theorem, and conversely, it makes no
sense to process data using ME. However, in those special cases when the same
piece of information can be both interpreted as data and as a constraint then
both methods can be used and they agree.
There are several justifications for the MaxEnt method. The earliest one,
the multiplicity argument, dates back to Boltzmann and Gibbs and is purely
probabilistic. One counts the number of microstates that are compatible with
each macrostate. Assuming that all microstates are equally likely, the most
probable macrostate is that with the largest number of microstates.
The next justification of the MaxEnt method followed from interpreting en-
tropy, through the Shannon axioms, as a measure of the “amount of uncertainty”
or of the “amount of information that is missing” in a probability distribution
[4, 1]. One limitation of this approach is that the Shannon axioms refer to
probabilities of discrete variables; for continuous variables the entropy is not
defined. But more serious objections can be raised, namely, even if we grant
that the Shannon axioms do lead to a reasonable expression for the entropy, to
what extent do we believe the axioms themselves? Shannon’s third axiom, the
grouping property, is indeed very reasonable, but is it necessary? Is entropy the
only consistent measure of uncertainty or of information? What is wrong with,
say, the standard deviation? Indeed, there even exist examples in which the
entropy does not seem to reflect one’s intuitive notion of information (see e.g.,
[5]). Other entropies, justified by a different choice of axioms, were subsequently
introduced [6]-[9].
From our point of view the real limitation is that Shannon was not con-
cerned with inductive inference. He was analyzing the capacity of communi-
cation channels. Shannon’s entropy makes no reference to prior distributions.
Indeed, MaxEnt, was conceived by Jaynes as a method of inference, on the basis
of testable information and an underlying physical measure. He never meant to
update from one probability distribution to another, and there was no induction
in the sense that no generalization from special cases was involved.
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Considerations such as these motivated several attempts to develop the ME
method directly as a method for updating probabilities without invoking ques-
tionable measures of uncertainty; prominent among these are the works by Shore
and Johnson [10], Skilling [12]-[14], and Csiszar [15].
The important contribution by Shore and Johnson was the realization that
one could axiomatize the updating method itself rather than the information
measure; they propose four axioms and show that the relative entropy is the
unique solution. Their axioms are justified on the basis of a fundamental prin-
ciple of consistency – if a problem can be solved in more than one way the
results should agree – but the axioms themselves and other assumptions they
make have raised some objections [11, 5]. Despite such criticism the enormous
influence of their pioneering papers is evident.
Skilling derives the maximum entropy method from axioms that are clearly
inspired by those of Shore and Johnson but his approach is different in several
important aspects. First, he broadens the subject matter beyond probabilities
to the determination of other positive-valued functions such as, for example, in-
tensities in an image. Whether this is a step forward is debatable. For example,
the broader scope of the method makes it riskier and the justification of the
axioms becomes a more delicate matter. Also, the extension beyond probabili-
ties to positive-valued functions does not necessarily represent a wider range of
applicability. After all, probabilities already provide us with the tools required
for reasoning under uncertainty, and once we can manipulate them, the recon-
struction of all sorts of other functions, including positive-valued ones, should
be tackled using Bayes’ theorem.
Second, and from our point of view, most important: Skilling spells out the
strategy one should follow to construct a general theory based on the analysis
of a few simple examples. This is a remarkable achievement for it constitutes
nothing less than a systematic quantitative method for induction, for general-
izing from special cases [13]. However, Skilling does not explore the possibility
of using his method for the purpose of updating probabilities; clearly this was
not his immediate goal.
The primary goal of this paper (sections 2 and 3) is to apply Skilling’s
method of induction to Shore and Johnson’s problem of updating probabilities
and, in the process, hopefully overcome at least some of the objections that can
be raised against either.
The procedure we follow differs in one remarkable way from the manner
that has in the past been followed in setting up physical theories. Normally one
starts by establishing a mathematical formalism, setting up a set of equations,
and then one tries to append an interpretation to it. This is a very difficult
problem; historically it has affected not only statistics and statistical physics –
what is the meaning of probabilities and of entropy – but also quantum theory –
what is the meaning of wave functions and amplitudes. The issue of whether the
proposed interpretation is unique, or even whether it is allowed, always remains
a legitimate objection and a point of controversy.
Here we proceed in the opposite order, we first decide what we are talking
about and what we want to accomplish, and only afterwards we design the ap-
3
propriate mathematical formalism. The advantage is that the issue of meaning
never arises. The preeminent example of this approach is Cox’s algebra of prob-
able inference which clarified the meaning and use of the notion of probability:
after Cox it was no longer possible to raise doubts about the legitimacy of the
degree of belief interpretation. A second example is special relativity: the actual
physical significance of the x and t appearing in the mathematical formalism
of Lorentz and Poincare was a matter of controversy until Einstein settled the
issue by deriving the formalism, i.e., the Lorentz transformations, from more
basic principles. Yet a third example relevant to quantum theory is given in
[16]. In this paper we explore a fourth example: the concept of relative entropy
is introduced as a tool for reasoning which, in the special case of uniform priors,
reduces to the usual entropy. There is no need for an interpretation in terms
of heat, multiplicity of states, disorder, or uncertainty, or even in terms of an
amount of information. Perhaps this is the explanation of why the search for the
meaning of entropy has turned out to be so elusive: ultimately, entropy needs
no interpretation. We do not need to know what ‘entropy’ means, we only need
to know how to use it.
There is a second function that the ME method must perform in order to
succeed as a method of inductive inference: once we have decided that the dis-
tribution of maximum entropy is to be preferred over all others we must address
the question of how reliable our choice is. In other words, to what extent do
we rule out all those distributions with entropies less than the maximum. This
matter is addressed in Section 4 following the treatment in [17]. In Section 5
we collect miscellaneous remarks on the choice and nature of the prior distri-
bution, on using entropy as a measure of amount of information, on choosing
constraints, and on the choices of axioms and how they are justified by other
authors.
Since information of different kinds, data or testable information, is meant
to be processed using different methods, it is quite clear that there is no uni-
versal rule for processing information, there is no universal theory of inductive
inference. But we can still ask whether there exists a theory of induction that
is sufficiently general for processing all testable information. In other words,
does the entropy depend on the particular special examples from which one is
generalizing? Is there a unique entropy? In Section 6 we find that a different
choice of special examples does, indeed, lead to a different functional form for
the entropy: there is no general theory for processing testable information. A
summary of our conclusions and some final comments are collected in section 7.
2 Entropy as a tool for induction
Consider a variable x in a space X ; x could be a discrete or a continuous
variable, in one or several dimensions. It might, for example, represent the
possible microstates of a physical system: x can be a point in phase space, or an
appropriate set of quantum numbers. Our uncertainty about x is described by a
probability distribution q(x). Our goal is to update from the prior distribution
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q(x) to a posterior distribution p(x) when new information in the form of a
constraint becomes available. The constraints can, but need not, be linear. The
question is what distribution p(x) should we select?
To select the posterior one could proceed by attempting to place all distri-
butions in increasing order of preference. Irrespective of what it is that makes
one distribution preferable over another it is clear any such ranking must be
transitive: if distribution p1 is preferred over distribution p2, and p2 is preferred
over p3, then p1 is preferred over p3. Such transitive rankings are implemented
by assigning to each p(x) a real number S[p] in such a way that if p1 is preferred
over p2, then S[p1] > S[p2]. The selected p will be that which maximizes the
functional S[p] which will be called the entropy of p. Thus the ME method
involves entropies which are real numbers and that are meant to be maximized.
These are features imposed by design; they are dictated by the function that
the ME method is supposed to perform .
Next, to define the ranking scheme, we must decide on the functional form of
S[p]. The purpose of the method is to do induction. We want to generalize from
those special cases where we know what the preferred distribution should be to
the much larger number of cases where we do not. Thus, in order to achieve
its purpose, S[p] will have to be of very general applicability; we will initially
assume that the same S[p] applies to all cases. There is no justification for this
generality beyond the usual pragmatic justification of induction: we must risk
making wrong generalizations in order to avoid the paralysis of not generalizing
at all.
The fundamental inductive principle is the seemingly trivial statement that
‘If a general theory exists, then it must apply to special cases’ [13]. But the
triviality is deceptive: the full power of the principle becomes clear once we
realize that if there exists a special case where the preferred distribution happens
to be known, then this knowledge can be used to constrain the form of S[p] and,
further, if a sufficient number of constraining examples happens to be known,
then S[p] can be determined completely. Of course, it is quite possible that
there be too many such constraints, that there is no S[p] satisfying them all.
One would then be forced to conclude that there is no general theory. In such a
situation the best one can do is produce theories of inductive inference that are
not completely general but that can still be useful if their range of applicability
is sufficiently wide.
The presumably “known” special cases, called the “axioms” of the theory,
play a crucial role: their choice defines which general theory is being constructed.
In our case, we want to design a theory for updating probability distributions.
The axioms below are chosen to reflect the conviction that one should not change
one’s mind frivolously, that the only aspects of one’s beliefs that should be
updated are those for which new evidence has been supplied. Our approach is
remarkably cautious; the axioms do not tell us what and how to update, they
merely tell us what not to update.
Degrees of belief, probabilities, are said to be subjective; two different in-
dividuals might not share the same beliefs and could conceivably assign prob-
abilities differently. But subjectivity does not mean arbitrariness. The reason
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subjective probabilities are introduced in the first place is to bring objectivity
into our reasoning: the subjectivity of probabilities does not extend to allow us
to assign some probabilities now and later revise them unless forced by new in-
formation that has in the meantime become available [18]. This “innocent until
proven guilty” attitude is designed to maximize objectivity: There are many
ways to change but only one to remain the same. It is also a recognition of the
high value we place on the prior probabilities which codify information that was
laboriously collected and processed in the past.
The three axioms and their consequences are listed below. The proofs are
given in the next section.
Axiom 1: Locality. Local information has local effects.
Suppose that the information to be processed refers only to a subdomain D ofX
and nothing is said about values of x outside D. We design the inference method
so that the probability for any x conditional on its being outside D, p(x|x /∈ D)
is not updated. We emphasize: the point is not that we make the unwarranted
assumption that keeping p(x|x /∈ D) fixed will lead to correct inferences; it may
not. The point is, rather, that in the absence of any supporting evidence there
is no reason to change our minds.
The consequence of axiom 1 is that non-overlapping domains of x contribute
additively to the entropy,
S[p] =
∫
dxF (p(x), x) , (1)
where F is some unknown function.
Axiom 2: Coordinate invariance. The system of coordinates carries no
information.
The points x can be labeled using any of a variety of coordinate systems. In
certain situations we might have explicit reasons to believe that a particular
choice of coordinates should be preferred over others. This information might
have been given to us in a variety of ways, but unless the evidence was, in fact,
given, we should not assume it: the ranking of probability distributions should
not depend on the coordinates used.
It may be useful to recall some facts about coordinate transformations. Con-
sider a change from old coordinates x to new coordinates x′ such that x = Γ(x′).
The new volume element dx′ includes the corresponding Jacobian,
dx = γ(x′)dx′ where γ(x′) =
∣∣∣∣ ∂x∂x′
∣∣∣∣ . (2)
Letm(x) be any density; in the new coordinates it transforms so that m(x)dx =
m′(x′)dx′. This is true, in particular, for the probability density p(x), therefore
m′(x′) = m (Γ(x′)) γ(x′) and p′(x′) = p (Γ(x′)) γ(x′). (3)
The coordinate transformation gives
S[p] =
∫
dxF (p(x), x) =
∫
γ(x′)dx′ F
(
p′(x′)
γ(x′)
,Γ(x′)
)
, (4)
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which is a mere change of variables. The identity above is valid always, for
all Γ and for all F ; it imposes no constraint on S[p]. The constraint arises
from realizing that we could equally well have ranked distributions according to
S[p′] =
∫
dx′ F (p′(x′), x′) and that this should have no effect on our conclusions.
This is the nontrivial constraint. It is not that we can change variables, we can
always do that; but rather that the two rankings, the one according to S[p]
and the other according to S[p′] must coincide. This requirement is satisfied
if, for example, S[p] and S[p′] turn out to be numerically equal, but this is not
necessary.
The consequence of axiom 2 is that S[p] can be written in terms of coordinate
invariants such as dxm(x) and p(x)/m(x),
S[p] =
∫
dxm(x)Φ
(
p(x)
m(x)
)
. (5)
The density m(x) and the function Φ are, at this point, still undetermined.
On the other hand the purpose for introducing S in the first place was to
update from a prior q(x) to a posterior p(x). We expect the entropy to be
a functional S[p|q] and not just S[p]. The question ‘Where is the prior?’ is
answered by invoking the locality axiom once again. The situation when no
new information is available is a special case of the situation when information
is given about states in a domain D. When we allow the domain D to shrink
to ∅ the requirement that the conditional probabilities p(x|x /∈ D) = p(x|x ∈
X) = p(x) should not be updated translates into
Axiom 1 (special case): When there is no new information there is no
reason to change one’s mind.
When there are no constraints the selected posterior distribution should coincide
with the prior distribution. The consequence of this second use of locality is
that the arbitrariness in the density m(x) is removed: up to normalizationm(x)
is the prior distribution.
Axiom 3: Subsystem independence. When a system is composed of
subsystems that are believed to be independent it should not matter whether the
inference procedure treats them separately or jointly.
Consider a system composed of two subsystems, x = (x1, x2) ∈ X = X1 ×X2.
Assume that all prior evidence led us to believe the systems were independent.
This belief is reflected in the prior distribution: if the subsystem priors m1(x1)
and m2(x2), then the prior for the whole system is m1(x1)m2(x2). Further
suppose that new information is acquired such that m1(x1) is updated to p1(x1)
and m2(x2) is updated to p2(x2). Nothing in this new information requires us
to revise our previous assessment of independence, therefore there is no need to
change our minds, and the prior for the whole system m1(x1)m2(x2) should be
updated to p1(x1)p2(x2).
We emphasize that the point is not that when we have no evidence for
correlations we draw the firm conclusion that the systems must necessarily be
independent. They could indeed have turned out to be correlated and then our
inferences would be wrong. Induction involves some risk. The point is rather
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that if we originally believe the subsystems to be independent and if the new
evidence is silent on the matter of correlations, then there is no reason to change
our minds. Indeed, to the extent that we place any value at all on whatever old
evidence led us to believe the subsystems were independent, then we ought not
to change our minds. As before, a feature of the probability distribution – in
this case, independence – will not be updated unless the evidence requires it.
The consequence of axiom 3 is to fix the function Φ. The final conclusion is
that probability distributions p(x) should be ranked relative to the prior m(x)
according to their (relative) entropy,
S[p|m] = −
∫
dx p(x) log
p(x)
m(x)
. (6)
The derivation has singled out a unique S[p|m] to be used in inductive inference.
Other expressions, may be useful for other purposes, but they do not constitute
an induction from the simple cases described in the axioms. Of course, as
emphasized above, induction is risky and failure is possible. The most common
cause of failure is that the constraints that are relevant have not been properly
identified. But it could very well happen that other equally compelling axioms,
leading to a different entropy, should have been used as the basis for induction.
An example is given below (Section 6).
3 The proofs
In this section we establish the consequences of the three axioms leading to the
final result eq.(6). The details of the proofs are important not just because
they lead to our final conclusions, but also because the translation of the verbal
statement of the axioms into precise mathematical form is a crucial part of
unambiguously specifying what the axioms actually say. Uffink, for example,
has shown [5] how the same axioms of Shore and Johnson [10] which led them
to the usual relative entropy can be implemented mathematically in such a
way that they lead not to the usual relative entropy but rather to the Renyi
entropies.
3.1 Locality
Here we prove that axiom 1 leads to the expression eq.(1) for S[p]. The require-
ment that probabilities be normalized is an annoying technical complication.
This problem can be conveniently overcome by allowing the functional S[p] to
be defined for all functions with p(x) ≥ 0 and to treat normalization as one
among so many other constraints that one might wish to impose.
To simplify the proof we consider the case of a discrete variable, pi with
i = 1, . . . , n, so that S[p] = S(p1, . . . , pn). The generalization to a continuum is
straightforward.
Suppose the space of states X is partitioned into two non-overlapping do-
mains D and D′ with D ∪D′ = X , and that the information to be processed is
8
in the form of separate constraints in each domain,∑
i∈D
aipi = A and
∑
i∈D′
a′ipi = A
′ . (7)
Axiom 1 states that the constraint on D′ does not have an influence on the con-
ditional probabilities pi|D. It may however influence the pis within D through
an overall multiplicative factor. To deal with this complication consider then a
special case where the overall probabilities of D and D′ are constrained too,∑
i∈D
pi = PD and
∑
i∈D′
pi = PD′ , (8)
with PD + PD′ = 1. Under these special circumstances constraints on D
′ may
not influence pis within D, and vice versa.
The obtain the posterior maximize S[p] subject to these four constraints,
0 =
[
δS − λ
(∑
i∈D
pi − PD
)
+ µ
(∑
i∈D
aipi −A
)
− λ′
(∑
i∈D′
pi − PD′
)
+ µ′
(∑
i∈D′
a′ipi −A
′
)]
,
leading to
∂S
∂pi
= λ+ µai for i ∈ D , (9)
∂S
∂pi
= λ′ + µ′a′i for i ∈ D
′ . (10)
Eqs.(7-10) are n+ 4 equations we must solve for the pis and the four Lagrange
multipliers.
Since S = S(p1, . . . , pn) its derivative ∂S/∂pi = fi(p1, . . . , pn) could in prin-
ciple also depend on all n variables. But this violates the locality axiom because
any arbitrary change in a′i within D
′ would influence probabilities outside D′.
The only way that probabilities withinD can be shielded from arbitrary changes
in the constraints pertaining to D′ is that the function fi(p1, . . . , pn) with i ∈ D
be independent of all pj ’s with j ∈ D
′.
With this restriction on the function fi the two systems of equations referring
to D and to D′ become totally decoupled and locality is preserved. But the
decoupling must hold not just for one particular partition of X into domains D
and D′, it must hold for all conceivable partitions. Therefore the locality axiom
requires S[p] to be such that its derivative fi depends only on the single variable
pi,
∂S
∂pi
= fi(pi) or
∂2S
∂pi∂pj
= 0 for i 6= j. (11)
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Integrating, one obtains
S[p] =
∑
i
Fi(pi) + constant . (12)
for some undetermined functions Fi. The corresponding expression for a contin-
uous variable x is obtained replacing i by x, and the sum over i by an integral
over x leading to eq.(1).
3.2 Coordinate invariance
Next we prove eq.(5) It is convenient to introduce a function m(x) which trans-
forms as a density and rewrite the expression (1) for the entropy in the form
S[p] =
∫
dxm(x)
1
m(x)
F
(
p(x)
m(x)
m(x), x
)
=
∫
dxm(x)Φ
(
p(x)
m(x)
,m(x), x
)
,
(13)
where the function Φ is defined by
Φ(α,m, x)
def
=
1
m
F (αm, x). (14)
Next, we consider a special situation where the new information are con-
straints which do not favor one coordinate system over another. For example
consider the constraint ∫
dx p(x)a(x) = A (15)
where a(x) is a scalar, i.e., invariant under coordinate changes,
a(x)→ a′(x′) = a(x). (16)
The usual normalization condition
∫
dx p(x) = 1 is a simple example of a scalar
constraint.
Maximizing S[p] subject to the constraint,
δ
[
S[p] + λ
(∫
dx p(x)a(x) −A
)]
= 0, (17)
gives
Φ˙
(
p(x)
m(x)
,m(x), x
)
= λa(x) , (18)
where
Φ˙ (α,m, x)
def
=
∂Φ (α,m, x)
∂α
(19)
is just the derivative with respect to the first argument. But we could have
started using the primed coordinates,
Φ˙
(
p′(x′)
m′(x′)
,m′(x′), x′
)
= λ′a′(x′), (20)
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or equivalently, using eqs.(3) and (16),
Φ˙
(
p(x)
m(x)
,m(x)γ(x′), x′
)
= λ′a(x). (21)
Dividing (21) by (18) we get
Φ˙ (α,mγ, x′)
Φ˙ (α,m, x)
=
λ′
λ
. (22)
This identity should hold for any transformation x = Γ(x′). On the right hand
side the multipliers λ and λ′ are just constants; the ratio λ′/λ might depend on
the transformation Γ but it does not depend on x. Consider the special case
of a transformation Γ that has unit determinant everywhere, γ = 1, and differs
from the identity transformation only within some arbitrary region D. Since
for x outside this region D we have x = x′, the left hand side of eq.(22) equals
1. Thus, for this particular Γ the ratio is λ′/λ = 1; but λ′/λ = constant, so
λ′/λ = 1 holds within D as well. Therefore, for x within D,
Φ˙ (α,m, x′) = Φ˙ (α,m, x) . (23)
Since the choice of D is arbitrary we conclude is that the function Φ˙ cannot
depend on its third argument, Φ˙ = Φ˙ (α,m).
Having eliminated the third argument, let us go back to eq.(22),
Φ˙ (α,mγ)
Φ˙ (α,m)
=
λ′
λ
, (24)
and consider a different transformation Γ, one with unit determinant γ = 1
outside the region D. Therefore the constant ratio λ′/λ is again equal to 1, so
that
Φ˙ (α,mγ) = Φ˙ (α,m) . (25)
But within D the transformation Γ is quite arbitrary, it could have any arbitrary
Jacobian γ 6= 1. Therefore the function Φ˙ cannot depend on its second argument
either, Φ˙ = Φ˙(α). Integrating with respect to α gives Φ = Φ(α)+constant. The
additive constant has no effect on the maximization and can be dropped. This
completes the proof of eq.(5).
3.3 The prior
The locality axiom implies that when there are no constraints the selected pos-
terior distribution should coincide with the prior distribution. This provides
us with an interpretation of the measure m(x) that had been so artificially in-
troduced. The argument is simple: maximize S[p] in (5) subject to the single
requirement of normalization,
δ
[
S[p] + λ
(∫
dx p(x)− 1
)]
= 0, (26)
11
to get
Φ˙
(
p(x)
m(x)
)
= λ. (27)
Since λ is a constant, the left hand side must be independent of x. This could,
for example, be accomplished if the function Φ˙(α) were itself a constant, inde-
pendent of its argument α. But this gives Φ(α) = c1α+ c2, where c1 and c2 are
constants, and leads to the unacceptable form S[p] ∝
∫
dx p(x). If the depen-
dence on x cannot be eliminated by an appropriate choice of Φ˙, we must secure
it by a choice of m(x). Eq.(27) is an equation for p(x); the obvious solution
is p(x) ∝ m(x). But in the absence of new information the selected posterior
distribution must reflect our prior beliefs, therefore m(x) must, except for an
overall normalization, be chosen to coincide with the prior distribution.
3.4 Independent subsystems
If x = (x1, x2) ∈ X = X1 ×X2, and the subsystem priors m1(x1) and m2(x2)
are independently updated to p1(x1) and p2(x2) respectively, then the prior for
the whole system m1(x1)m2(x2) should be updated to p1(x1)p2(x2).
We need only consider a special case where the posterior distributions for
the individual systems, p1(x1) and p2(x2), happen to be known. When the
systems are treated separately this is the trivial case of extremely constraining
information: for system 1 we want to maximize S1[p] subject to the constraint
that p(x1) is p1(x1), the result being, naturally, p(x1) = p1(x1). A similar result
holds for system 2.
When the systems are treated jointly, however, the inference is not nearly
as trivial. We want to maximize the entropy of the joint system,
S[p] =
∫
dx1dx2 m(x1, x2)Φ
(
p(x1, x2)
m(x1, x2)
)
, (28)
where the joint prior m(x1, x2) is a product, m1(x1)m2(x2), and the constraints
on the joint distribution p(x1, x2) are∫
dx2 p(x1, x2) = p1(x1) and
∫
dx1 p(x1, x2) = p2(x2). (29)
Notice that here we have not written just two constraints. We actually have one
constraint for each value of x1 and of x2; this is an infinity of constraints, each
of which must be multiplied by its own Lagrange multiplier, λ1(x1) or λ2(x2).
Then,
δ
[
S[p]−
∫
dx1λ1(x1)
(∫
dx2 p(x1, x2)− p1(x1)
)
− {1↔ 2}
]
= 0, (30)
where {1 ↔ 2} indicates a third term, similar to the second, with 1 and 2
interchanged. The independent variations δp(x1, x2) yield
Φ′
(
p(x1, x2)
m1(x1)m2(x2)
)
= λ1(x1) + λ2(x2). (31)
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(The prime indicates a derivative with respect to the argument.) But we know
that the selected posterior should be the product p(x1, x2) = p1(x1)p2(x2).
Then,
Φ′ (y) = λ1(x1) + λ2(x2), where y =
p1(x1)p2(x2)
m1(x1)m2(x2)
. (32)
Differentiating with respect to x1 and to x2, yields
yΦ′′′(y) + Φ′′(y) = 0 , (33)
which can easily be integrated three times to give
Φ(y) = ay log y + by + c. (34)
The additive constant c may be dropped: its contribution to the entropy would
appear in a term that does not depend on the probabilities and would have no
effect on the ranking scheme. At this point the entropy takes the form
S[p] =
∫
dx
(
ap(x) log
p(x)
m(x)
+ bp(x)
)
. (35)
This S[p] will be maximized subject to constraints which always include normal-
ization. Since this is implemented by adding a term λ
∫
dx p(x), the b constant
can always be absorbed into the undetermined multiplier λ. Thus, the term
bp(x) has no effect on the selected distribution and can be dropped.
Finally, a is just an overall multiplicative constant, it also does not affect
the overall ranking except in the trivial sense that inverting the sign of a will
transform the maximization problem to a minimization problem or vice versa.
We can therefore set a = −1 so that maximum S corresponds to maximum
preference. The opposite choice a = 1 leads to what is usually called the cross-
entropy or the Kullback number.
4 To what extent are non-ME distributions ruled
out?
Suppose we have maximized the entropy (6) subject to certain constraints and
obtained a probability distribution p0(x). The question we now address concerns
the extent to which p0(x) should be preferred over other distributions with lower
entropy. Consider a family of distributions p(x|θ), labelled by a finite number
nθ of parameters θ
i (i = 1, . . . , nθ). We assume that the p(x|θ) satisfy the same
constraints and include p0(x) = p(x|θ = 0).
The question about the extent to which p(x|θ = 0) is preferred over p(x|θ 6=
0) is a question about the probability of θ, π(θ). The original problem which led
us to invoke ME method was to assign a probability to x; our new problem is to
assign probabilities to x and θ. We are concerned not just with p(x) but rather
with p(x, θ); the universe of discourse has been expanded from X to X × Θ
where Θ is the space of parameters θ. The joint distribution p(x, θ) will also be
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determined using the ME method. To proceed we must address two questions:
What is the prior distribution, what do we know about x and θ before we learnt
about the constraints? And second, what are the constraints on p(x, θ)?
This first question is the more subtle one: when we know nothing about the
θs we know neither their physical meaning nor whether there is any relation
to the x. A prior that reflects this lack of correlations is a product, m(x, θ) =
m(x)µ(θ). We will assume that the prior over x is known (it is the prior we had
used to update from m(x) to p0(x)), but µ(θ) is unknown. Suppose next that
we are told that the θs are just parameters labeling some distributions p(x|θ).
We do not yet know the functional form of p(x|θ), but if the θs derive their
meaning solely from the p(x|θ) then for each choice of p(x|θ) there is a natural
distance in the space Θ: it is given by the Fisher-Rao metric dℓ2 = gijdθ
idθj ,
[8]
gij =
∫
dx p(x|θ)
∂ log p(x|θ)
∂θi
∂ log p(x|θ)
∂θj
. (36)
Accordingly we choose µ(θ) = g1/2(θ), where g(θ) is the determinant of gij .
To each different choice of the functional form of p(x|θ) there corresponds a
different subspace of the space of joint distributions defined by distributions of
the form p(x, θ) = π(θ)p(x|θ). The crucial constraint specifies which particular
functional form for p(x|θ) we have in mind; this provides meaning to the θs and
fixes the prior and the relevant subspace. Notice that this constraint is not in
the usual form of an expectation value.
The preferred distribution p(x, θ) is chosen by varying π(θ) to maximize
σ[π] = −
∫
dx dθ π(θ)p(x|θ) log
π(θ)p(x|θ)
g1/2(θ)m(x)
= S[π] +
∫
dθ π(θ)S(θ), (37)
where
S[π] = −
∫
dθ π(θ) log
π(θ)
g1/2(θ)
and S(θ) = −
∫
dx p(x|θ) log
p(x|θ)
m(x)
. (38)
The notation shows that σ[π] and S[π] are functionals of π(θ) while S(θ) is
a function of θ. Maximizing (37) with respect to variations δπ(θ) such that∫
dθ π(θ) = 1, yields
0 =
∫
dθ
(
− log
π(θ)
g1/2(θ)
+ S(θ) + log ζ
)
δπ(θ) , (39)
where the required Lagrange multiplier has been written as 1− log ζ. Therefore
the probability that the value of θ should lie within the small volume g1/2(θ)dθ
is
π(θ)dθ =
1
ζ
eS(θ)g1/2(θ)dθ with ζ =
∫
dθ g1/2(θ) eS(θ). (40)
Equation (40) is the result we seek. It tells us that, as expected, the preferred
value of θ is that which maximizes the entropy S(θ) because this maximizes
the scalar probability density expS(θ). But it also tells us the degree to which
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values of θ away from the maximum are ruled out. For macroscopic systems
the preference for the ME distribution can be overwhelming. Eq.(40) agrees
with the Einstein thermodynamic fluctuation theory and extends it beyond
the regime of small fluctuations [17]. Note also that the density expS(θ) is a
scalar function and the presence of the Jacobian factor g1/2(θ) makes Eq.(40)
manifestly invariant under changes of the coordinates θi in the space Θ.
To conclude this section we remark that there is a certain analogy in the
relation between the MaxEnt and ME methods and the relation between the
maximum likelihood and Bayes’ theorem methods. Maximizing the likelihood
function L(θ|x)
def
= p(x|θ) selects a single preferred θ. But L(θ|x) is not a
probability distribution for θ and the maximum likelyhood method does not,
without further elaborations and unlike the more general Bayesian approach,
address the question of the extent to which other values of θ are ruled out.
5 Random remarks
5.1 Choosing the prior
Choosing the prior density m(x) can be tricky. When there is no information
leading us to prefer one microstate of a physical system over another we might
as well assign equal prior probability to each state. Thus it is reasonable to
identify m(x) with the density of states and the invariantm(x)dx is the number
of microstates in dx. This is the basis for statistical mechanics – the postulate of
equal a priori probabilities. Other examples of relevance to physics arise when
there is no reason to prefer one region of the space X over another. Then we
should assign the same prior probability to regions of the same volume, and we
can choose
∫
R
dxm(x) to be the volume of a region R in the space X .
All entropies are relative entropies. In the case of a discrete variable, if we
assign equal a priori probabilities, mi = 1, the entropy is
S[p] = −
∑
i
pi log pi , (41)
the entropy function discovered by Boltzmann and by Shannon. The notation
S[p] has a serious drawback: it misleads one into thinking that S depends on
p(x) only. In particular, we emphasize that whenever the expression (41) is used,
the prior measure mi = 1 has been implicitly assumed. In Shannon’s axioms,
for example, this choice is implicitly made in his first axiom, when he states
that the entropy is a function of the probabilities S = S(p1...pn) and nothing
else, and also in his second axiom when the uniform distribution pi = 1/n is
singled out for special treatment.
The absence of an explicit reference to a prior mi in (41) may erroneously
suggest that prior distributions have been rendered unnecessary and can be
eliminated. It suggests that it is possible to transform information (i.e., con-
straints) directly into posterior distributions in a totally objective and unique
way. If this were true the old controversy, of whether probabilities are subjective
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or objective, would have been resolved – probabilities would ultimately be to-
tally objective. But the priormi = 1 is implicit in eq.(41); the postulate of equal
a priori probabilities or Laplace’s “Principle of Insufficient Reason” still plays
a major, though perhaps hidden, role. Any claims that probabilities assigned
using maximum entropy will yield absolutely objective results are unfounded;
not all subjectivity has been eliminated. Just as with Bayes’ theorem, what is
objective here is the manner in which information is processed to update from
a prior to a posterior, and not the prior probability assignments themselves.
What if m(x) = 0 for some x? S[p|m] can be infinitely negative when m(x)
vanishes within some region D. In other words, the ME method confers an
overwhelming preference on those distributions p(x) that vanish whenever m(x)
does. But this is not a problem. A similar “problem” also arises in the context
of Bayes’ theorem where a vanishing prior represents a tremendously serious
prejudice because no amount of data to the contrary would allow us to revise
it. The solution in both cases is to recognize that unless we are absolutely
certain that x could not possibly lie within D then we should not have assigned
m(x) = 0 in the first place. Assigning a very low but non-zero prior represents
a safer and less prejudiced representation of one’s beliefs both in the context of
Bayesian and of ME inference.
5.2 Entropy as a measure of information
The notion of information is a vague one. Any attempt to find its measure will
always be open to the objection that it is not clear what is being measured. On
the other hand there is absolutely no ambiguity involved in the prescription of
how entropy as preference is used – even if one does not know precisely what
is being preferred. It is a prescription motivated by one’s desire not to change
one’s mind unless compelled by concrete evidence. It appears that rather than
allowing the vagueness of the notion of amount of information to contaminate
the notion of entropy one should proceed in the other direction and allow the
unambiguous notion of entropy to confer precision on the notion of amount of
information.
Thus the amount of information missing in a discrete distribution pi should
be defined as a relative entropy S[p|m]. Since S[p|m] is maximized for pi ∝ mi,
the special distribution mi should be selected to agree with whatever prior
notions we have about which distribution contains the least information. A
reasonable candidate, suggested by the Principle of Insufficient Reason, is the
uniform distribution, mi = m. The constant m is then determined by the
requirement that when we have complete knowledge there is no missing infor-
mation. Imposing S[p|m] = 0 when pi = δij for some integer j, yields m = 1.
Thus Shannon’s measure is recovered.
5.3 Comments on other axiomatizations
One feature that distinguishes the various axiomatizations is how they justify
maximizing a functional. In other words why maximum entropy? In the ap-
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proach of Shore and Johnson this question receives no answer; it is just one of
the axioms. Csiszar provides a better answer. He derives the ‘maximize a func-
tional’ rule from reasonable axioms of regularity and locality [15]. In Skilling’s
and in the approach developed here the rule is not derived, but it does no go
unexplained either: it is imposed by design, it is justified by the function that
S is supposed to perform, to achieve a transitive ranking.
Both Shore and Johnson and Csiszar require, and it is not clear why, that
updating from a prior must lead to a unique posterior, and accordingly, there
is a restriction that the constraints define a convex set. In Skilling’s approach
and in the one advocated here there is no requirement of uniqueness, we are
perfectly willing to entertain situations where the available information points
to several equally preferable distributions.
There is an important difference between the axiomatic approach presented
by Csiszar and the present one. Since our ME method is a method for induction
we are justified in applying the method as if it were of universal applicability.
As with all inductive procedures, in any particular instance of induction can
turn out to be wrong – because, for example, not all relevant information has
been taken into account – but this does not change the fact that ME is still
the unique inductive inference method that generalizes from the special cases
chosen as axioms. Csiszar’s version of the MaxEnt method is not designed to
generalize beyond the axioms. His method was developed for linear constraints
and therefore he does not feel justified in carrying out his deductions beyond the
cases of linear constraints. In our case, the form of S[p|q] from the axioms was
a matter of deduction but the application to non-linear constraints is precisely
the kind of induction we want to carry out.
5.4 On constraints
First of all, one should not confuse questions about how information should be
processed from questions about how the information is obtained. This applies
both to the case of processing data using Bayes’ theorem and of processing
information in the form of constraints or testable information using ME. Bayes’
theorem solves the problem of how data is used to update from a prior to a
posterior distribution; it does not address all those interesting issues concerning
the actual collection of data – the whole of experimental science. Similarly, the
ME method is designed to process information in the form of a specification of
the family of allowed posteriors. Where and how that information is obtained
is not a problem addressed by the ME method.
Having made that distinction, we can still ask how the information to be
processed using ME is actually obtained. One point to be made is that empirical
data, even sample averages, do not refer to probabilities, and therefore do not
provide constraints on probability distributions. Confusing expected values with
sample averages leads to inconsistencies, particularly for small samples [19].
Data on sample averages requires Bayes’ theorem, information about expected
values requires ME. Of course, for very large samples inconsistencies disappear,
and both the Bayesian and the ME approaches agree.
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Once we accept that constraints will refer to the expected values of certain
variables, how do we decide their numerical magnitudes? And, for that matter,
which variables do we choose? Indeed, what constraints should we choose?
When justifying the use of the ME method to obtain, say, the canonical
Boltzmann factors (Pq ∝ e
−βEq) it has been common to say something like “we
seek the minimally biased (i.e. maximum entropy) distribution that codifies the
information we have (the expected energy) and nothing else”. Many authors
find this justification objectionable. Indeed, they might argue, for example, that
the spectrum of black body radiation is what it is independently of whatever
information happens to be available to us. We prefer to phrase the objection
differently: in most realistic situations the expected value of the energy is not
a quantity we happen to know. Nevertheless, it is still true that maximizing
entropy subject to a constraint on this (unknown) expected energy leads to
the right family of distributions. Therefore, the justification behind imposing
a constraint on the expected energy cannot be that this is a quantity that
happens to be known – because of the brute fact that we never know it –
but rather because the expected energy is the quantity that should be known.
Even if unknown, we recognize it as the crucial relevant information without
which no successful predictions are possible. Therefore we proceed as if this
crucial information were available and produce a formalism that contains the
temperature as a free parameter. The actual value of the temperature will have
to be inferred from the experiment itself either directly, using a thermometer,
or indirectly by Bayesian analysis from other empirical data.
To summarize: the constraints that should be imposed are those that codify
information that, even if unknown, is relevant and necessary for a successful
inference.
One last remark on constraints and their relation to priors: the distribution
m(x) represents our prior beliefs, including information that might have been
taken into account in earlier applications of the ME method. It is important to
realize that later applications of ME for processing new constraints need not in
general preserve old constraints. The reason is that when a new constraint is
given one is implicitly admitting that all probability distributions satisfying the
new constraint are in principle possible, and this will be interpreted as evidence
which contradicts the old constraints and requires their updating. The speci-
fication of the allowed family of posteriors must be complete: this means that
in addition to the new constraints one should also impose those old constraints
that are not meant to be updated.
6 Is entropy unique?
The entropy is a tool for generalizing from special cases and its functional form
follows from the choice of the specific cases described in the axioms. One could
very well expect that a different choice of special cases would lead to a different
generalization. Is entropy unique? Is there a universal theory of inductive
inference for processing testable information? Here we develop a theory of
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inference based on a different choice for the third axiom which is the one that
determines the function Φ in eq.(5).
6.1 An alternative third axiom
Consider a system composed of two subsystems, x = (x1, x2) ∈ X = X1 ×
X2. Assume that prior evidence has led us to believe the subsystems are not
independent. This belief is reflected in a prior distributionm(x1, x2) which does
not factor into a product of independent priors for the subsystems. Beyond
telling us how we believe the subsystems are correlated, the prior m(x1, x2) also
tells us what we believe about each of the two subsystems separately. These
beliefs are codified in the marginal distributions∫
dx2 m(x1, x2) = m1(x1) and
∫
dx1 m(x1, x2) = m2(x2) . (42)
Now suppose that new information tells us that the two subsystems are actually
independent. We want to select the posterior within the family of independent
distributions, p1(x1)p2(x2). Thus we should update our old information about
correlations, but since the new evidence is silent about those aspects of the
distribution that refer to each of the subsystems by themselves there is no
reason to update the marginal distributions. In this case the updated posterior
should be p(x1, x2) = m1(x1)m2(x2). This is written as an alternative third
axiom:
Axiom 3-alt: Subsystem marginals. When a system is composed of
subsystems and the information to be processed refers only to the correlations
between them there is no need to update whatever beliefs we might have about
them individually.
We emphasize yet again that the point is not that when we have no evidence
that requires updating the marginals we conclude they must necessarily remain
unchanged. It is just that a feature of the probability distribution – in this case,
the marginals – will not be updated unless the evidence requires it.
The consequence of Axiom 3-alt is to fix the function Φ. The final conclusion
is that probability distributions p(x) should be ranked relative to the priorm(x)
according to a new (relative) entropy,
S˜[p|m] =
∫
dxm(x) log
p(x)
m(x)
, (43)
which, incidentally, happens to be the “dual” of the relative entropy: S˜[p|m] =
S[m|p].
Before we proceed to the proof we remark on the significance of this result:
The two axioms 3 and 3-alt seem equally compelling in the sense that both
refuse to update features of the prior unless required by the evidence. But the
two axioms are incompatible with each other. Therefore, we are led to conclude
that there is no general theory of induction which simultaneously applies to the
special cases described in all four of the axioms.
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6.2 Proof
The mathematical manipulations below follow closely those used by Skilling to
solve a related but decidedly different problem – that of selecting a model [12].
Maximize the joint entropy
S˜[p] =
∫
dx1dx2 m(x1, x2)Φ
(
p(x1, x2)
m(x1, x2)
)
, (44)
subject to the constraint that p(x1, x2) = p1(x1)p2(x2), and that p1(x1) and
p2(x2) are individually normalized. Independent variations δp1(x1) and δp2(x2)
lead to ∫
dx2 Φ
′
(
p1(x1)p2(x2)
m(x1, x2)
)
p2(x2) = λ1 and {1↔ 2} , (45)
where the prime denotes derivative with respect to the argument and {1 ↔ 2}
denotes a similar equation with the subscripts 1 and 2 interchanged. We know
that the selected posterior should be m1(x1)m2(x2), therefore we obtain the
following equations for the function Φ,∫
dx2 Φ
′
(m1m2
m
)
p2 = λ1 and {1↔ 2} , (46)
where the arguments x1 and x2 have been omitted. But there are many other
priors M = m+ δm with exactly the same marginals which should lead to the
same inference. Changing the prior by δm, changes the equation for Φ by∫
dx2 Φ
′′
(m1m2
m
)(m1m2
m
)2
δm = −m1δλ1 and {1↔ 2} . (47)
The conditions for δm to preserve the marginals are that∫
dx1 δm(x1, x2) = 0 for all x2, and {1↔ 2} . (48)
Since the most general marginal-preserving δm is given by perturbations of the
form
δm(x1, x2) =
∫
da1db1da2db2 ε(a1, b1, a2, b2)
[δ(x1 − a1)− δ(x1 − b1)] [δ(x2 − a2)− δ(x2 − b2)] , (49)
we need only consider the special case
δm(x1, x2) = ε [δ(x1 − a1)− δ(x1 − b1)] [δ(x2 − a2)− δ(x2 − b2)] . (50)
Substituting into eq.(47) gives
[δ(x1 − a1)− δ(x1 − b1)] Φ
′′
(m1m2
m
)(m1m2
m
)2∣∣∣∣
a2
b2
= −m1(x1)δλ1 , (51)
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and {1 ↔ 2}. In order for this equation to hold when the δ functions vanish
(x1 6= a1 and x1 6= b1) we must have δλ1 = 0. In order to hold when the δ
functions do not vanish, for example when x1 = a1, we must have
Φ′′
(
m1(a1)m2(x2)
m(a1, x2)
)(
m1(a1)m2(x2)
m(a1, x2)
)2∣∣∣∣∣
x2=a2
x2=b2
= 0 . (52)
The only way this equation can hold for arbitrary choices of a1, a2 and b2 is
that the function Φ be such that
Φ′′(y)y2 = A = constant (53)
Integrating twice leads to
Φ′(y) = −
A
y
+B and Φ(y) = −A log y +By + C , (54)
so that,
S˜[p|m] = −A
∫
dxm(x) log
p(x)
m(x)
+B
∫
dx p(x) + C
∫
dxm(x) . (55)
The last term is a constant independent of p(x), it has no influence on the
ranking of ps and can be dropped. The constant B can always be absorbed into
the Lagrange multiplier for the normalization constraint; it can be dropped too.
Finally, we choose A = −1 so that maximum S˜[p|m] corresponds to maximum
preference. This concludes the proof.
7 Conclusions and final remarks
We have established that the ME is a full-fledged method for updating from
prior to posterior distributions. It is designed for the processing of testable
information. Furthermore, the method does not just determine a single posterior
but it allows one to quantify the extent to which other distributions that also
satisfy the constraints are ruled out.
An important feature of ME is that the entropy requires no interpretation;
it is merely a tool for updating. Its functional form, however, depends on the
specific choice of cases from which one intends to generalize. Thus, there is no
general theory of induction – not for probability distributions and much less for
positive functions. Having found a second apparently legitimate entropy, the
door is open to the possibility that there may be others. Indeed, it appears
that legislating that one should not update any features of the prior except
when forced by the evidence is too restricting: we must accept the fact that not
all features of the prior can be preserved, that some features take precedence
over others. Different choices of axioms correspond to different choices of which
features are preferred.
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It is an empirical fact that selecting independence as a feature to be preferred
leads to correct inferences in an enormously wide variety of cases including
the whole of range of systems successfully described in statistical physics and
physical chemistry – this includes all sorts of properties of gases, liquids, solids,
plasmas, etc. An induction based on the relative entropy S[p|m] may not be of
universal validity, but its wide range of application makes it definitely useful.
On the other hand, the preservation of marginals, which leads to using S˜[p|m],
does not seem nearly as useful.
It is interesting that if instead of axiomatizing the inference process, one
axiomatizes the entropy itself by specifying those properties expected of a mea-
sure of separation between (possibly unnormalized) distributions one is led to a
continuum of “entropies,” [8]
Sδ(p|q) =
−1
δ(1 − δ)
∫
dx
[
δp+ (1− δ)q − pδq1−δ
]
, (56)
equivalent, for the purpose of updating, to the relative Renyi entropies [6, 7].
The shortcoming of this approach is that it is not clear when and how such
entropies are to be used, which features of a probability distribution are being
updated and which preserved, or even in what sense do these entropies measure
an amount of information. Remarkably, if one further requires that Sδ be ad-
ditive over independent sources of uncertainty, as any self-respecting measure
ought to be, then the continuum in δ is restricted to just the two values δ = 0
and δ = 1 which correspond to the two entropies derived in this paper: S1
and S0 are equivalent to our S and S˜. This raises the interesting question of
whether it is possible to identify a δ-continuum of alternatives to Axiom 3. To
conclude our brief remarks on the entropies Sδ we point out first, that there
exist a variety of physical examples where it appears that maximizing an Sδ
yields reasonable results (the Sδ are equivalent to the Tsallis’ entropies [9]); and
second, that there is one very intriguing suggestion that using Sδ need not be
incompatible with a more standard use of MaxEnt or ME [20].
Finally, it is clear that the extended method of maximum entropy which we
have here called ME should allow us to tackle problems which cannot be envis-
aged within the more restricted scope of MaxEnt. Two examples are presented
in these proceedings [21, 22].
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